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How should green taxation be designed so that it accommodates producer interests? 
We argue that to design green taxes which are high enough to have the desired 
incentive effects, tax revenues must be reimbursed, either by earmarking them for 
environmental subsidies or by reducing other taxes directed at industry. If green tax 
schemes can be designed this way, industry will have little incentive to mobilise 
strong opposition to green taxation. However, in practice, the requirement of 
reimbursement may be difficult to fulfil because, with few exceptions, polluting 
industries are not homogeneous. This means that reimbursement will redistribute 
financial resources within industry and thus create winners and losers. Still, green 
taxes can be used in heterogeneous industries which can be created by operating 
separate tax schemes for each branch of industry. The Danish case of pesticide 
taxation demonstrates that relatively high tax levels can be implemented if an equal 
relationship between the tax object and the object determining the level of refunds 
exists throughout the sector. This means that revenues can be reimbursed without 
creating redistribution within producer communities. 
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  1 1: Introduction 
 
Traditionally, pollution in Western Europe has been regulated by the use of standards 
(the command-and-control approach). It tends ‘to force all businesses to adopt the 
same measures and practices of pollution control and thus accept identical shares of 
the pollution control burden regardless of their relative impacts’ (Andersen, 1994, p. 
21). Among environmental researchers and policy makers, there is a growing 
scepticism towards this type of pollution control. It is argued that environmental 
improvement is progressing too slowly and, in some situations, is leading to even 
further deterioration of the environment.  
 
Therefore, policy makers search for other solutions. In particular, there is a growing 
interest in market-based environmental policy instruments such as green taxation. 
Throughout Europe, academics and policy makers are vigorously discussing this 
option. 
 
Still, the level of green taxation in Europe is set too low to have the desired effect on 
environmental behaviour. Thus, Howe (1994) concludes that the main effect of green 
taxation is fiscal rather than environmental. For example, green taxation has been 
applied in relation to the reduction of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in OECD 
countries. However, one may argue that even though CO2 taxes are differentiated, 
they may lead to the required environmental results. A straightforward way of 
measuring these environmental results is simply to look at the nominal emission 
development in the five OECD countries where CO2 taxes so far have been applied: 
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Table 1   Total CO2 emissions in countries with CO2 taxation from 1990 – 1997  
 
 CO2  tax,  year  1990 1997 Increase  1990-97 
Denmark  1992-93  53 63 19% 
Sweden  1990  55 57 4% 
Norway  1991  35 41 17% 
Finland  1990  73 77 5% 
Netherlands  1990  160 179 12% 
Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest million ton. 




Note, that Table 1 uses nominal CO2 emission figures and the year 1990 as reference 
year because these two criteria are used in the Kyoto Protocol which is an 
international agreement on national CO2 target levels (see Daugbjerg and Svendsen, 
2001, Chapter 6). Table 1 shows that CO2 emissions have increased significantly 
since 1990 for all five countries that have applied CO2 taxation. As shown, the CO2 
taxes were all introduced in the beginning of the 1990’s. 
 
E.g. Denmark’s total CO2 emissions have increased from 53 million tons in 1990 to 
63 million tons in 1997 (19per cent) and Norway’s total CO2 emissions have 
increased from 35 million tons in 1990 to 41 million tons (17per cent). So, in general, 
CO2 taxation has not succeeded in cutting actual emissions in order to achieve the 
stated target levels such as those found in the Kyoto Protocol.  
 
The numbers in Table 2 provide simple and strong evidence and do, of course, cover 
much detail which we have chosen to leave out in this setting. E.g., choosing 1990 as 
the starting year in the Kyoto Protocol is not favourable to Denmark. 1990 was a wet 
year in Norway and therefore, Denmark imported much Norwegian hydropower that 
year implying low starting figures. In other years Denmark is typically a net exporter 
of coal produced electricity (Varming et al., 2000, 199). Still, Denmark signed the 
  3 Kyoto Protocol thus accepting the use of nominal emission figures rather than figures 
corrected for imports and exports of electricity. 
 
Because emissions have increased rather than decreased, we see a strong need to 
undertake an analysis of the politics of green taxation to reveal why this policy 
instrument may not work as intended. At first sight, this is puzzling because we would 
expect polluting industries to prefer green taxes to traditional command-and-control 
regulations (e.g. standards) for at least two reasons. Firstly, environmental economists 
have demonstrated that green taxes involve less economic costs to society than 
standards (e.g. Baumol and Oates, 1971; 1988). Secondly, the use of taxes allows 
individual industrial producers greater flexibility than regulations in achieving 
pollution reduction (OECD, 1997, 9). Green taxes leave individual producers free to 
decide how to reduce pollution, whereas regulations tend to specify which actions 
must be taken. 
 
In general, environmental economists have paid no, or at best very little, attention to 
the political context within which green taxation would be introduced (Daugbjerg and 
Svendsen, 2001). In the development of environmental policy instruments which have 
a realistic chance of being implemented, the political constraints and opportunities 
must be taken into account. An important constraint is the ability of industrial 
associations succesfully to oppose environmental measures which they find too 
burdensome. This political power of industry cannot be neglected.. This raises the 
following question: how should green taxes be designed so that they accommodates 
industrial interests without neutralizing their effectiveness? It is argued here that it is 
important to combine them with reimbursement schemes which do not redistribute 
economic resources within industry.  
 
Green taxation does have a certain potential in environmental regulation which can be 
utilised in the future though it is not a universal measure which can be successfully 
applied in all situations. This requires that policy designers give higher priority to the 
political dimension of the instrument. Several researchers have argued that the choice 
of instruments is a political process and not a matter of finding the or those 
instrument(s) which best fulfil the objectives of a policy (e.g. Daugbjerg 1995, 1998a, 
1998b, 1998c, 1999; Doern and Phidd 1983, Hood 1983, Howlett and Ramesh 1994, 
  4 Linder and Peters 1989; Majone 1989, Salamon 1981, 265). Elmore (1987, 175) 
suggests that the choice of policy instruments ‘has more to do with coalition politics than 
with their operating characteristics’. Ultimately, instruments are chosen because they 
are able to generate the necessary political support, Still, the discipline of 
environmental economics has not moved in the direction of political economy in spite 
of the early advice to do so by Buchanan and Tullock. Already in 1975, they 
concluded that to make green taxation more attractive to policy makers, economists 
should ‘begin to search out and invent institutional arrangements that will make the 
penalty tax acceptable to those who are primarily affected’ (Buchanan and Tullock, 
1975, 147).  
 
The real challenge for both social science environmental research and environmental 
policy makers is to combine economic efficiency and political acceptability. Simple 
theoretical outlining is important because the reality of environmental regulation is 
extremely complex. Here, the principle of Ochams’ razor is truly needed: any 
inessential premises or complexities ought to be cut out of an argument. Hence, in an 
attempt to suggest simple and forceful propositions, we attempt to meet the challenge 
by suggesting some ways to design green tax schemes which will help to overcome 
the political opposition identified in our analysis of real-life green tax policy making.  
 
In Section 2, it is discussed how green tax schemes can be constructed in order to 
make them more politically acceptable to industry. Section 3 presents empirical 
evidence concerning reimbursement schemes for CO2 taxation in Denmark, Norway 
and Sweden. Subsequently, reimbursement of tax revenues and the problem of 
redistribution is discussed in Section 4. Finally, the limitations and opportunities 








  5 2: Making green taxation politically acceptable 
 
Environmental regulation produces costs and benefits as do other types of regulatory 
policy (see Leone, 1986, 3). Pollution control distributes cost and benefits in various 
ways. The most difficult type of pollution control occurs when regulation concentrates 
the costs of implementing policy on a well-defined group of polluters and the benefits 
of policy are dispersed. For instance, reduction of air pollution, , is costly to industry 
(unless it is compensated for the costs incurred) because it has to pay for the 
installation of equipment to combat pollution. These costs may be difficult to pass on 
to consumers. The benefits are dispersed both in space and time. Environmental 
improvement is widely dispersed to a large group of persons (e.g. the public at large) 
in which each member is only affected at the margin. Furthermore, environmental 
improvement may also involve a time dimension as it may affect future generations 
positively.  
 
This distribution of policy costs and benefits means that industry has strong incentives 
to organise opposition to the introduction of burdensome environmental policies 
because each of them has a lot to win if political action bears fruit. In other words, it 
pays off to contribute to collective action. Those benefiting from pollution control do 
not have similar incentives to enter the policy process. Since benefits are widely 
dispersed, each member of the benefiting group has little to win and therefore little 
motivation to invest resources (such as time and money) in organising, or mobilising 
political support, for environmental regulation. Such a distribution of costs and 
benefits means that environmental politics becomes the politics of cost distribution. 
Typically, this type of environmental politics can be found in economic sectors, such 
as industry and agriculture. The politics of green taxation can be characterised the 
same way.  
 
Many environmental economists argue that green taxes limit pollution at something 
which approximates minimum costs to society - if properly designed and 
implemented (e.g. Baumol and Oates, 1988, 155; Pearce and Turner, 1990, 94–6; 
Pearce et al., 1989, 155). Clearly, societal efficiency concerns is the central economic 
  6 argument behind this statement. However, taxation may be more costly to polluters 
than regulation. Hence, they strongly oppose this type of environmental regulation. 
 
The use of environmental taxation is an efficient way of undertaking pollution control 
from a macro-economic perspective. However, if tax revenues are not refunded to 
polluters, taxation is more costly to them than regulation. This may be clarified by a 
hypothetical example. Assume that we have two polluting firms; Firm 1 and Firm 2. 
As shown in Figure 1 below, Firm 2 has smaller reduction costs (MC2) than Firm 1 
(MC1). 
 













  7 Environmental authorities can use a standard or a tax to achieve the objective of 
reaching the q* target level. A standard would require each polluter to reduce the 
emissions by q*. However, this approach may be an expensive way to reduce 
pollution because, at existing levels of output, the marginal cost of reducing emissions 
for Firm 2 is smaller than the marginal cost for Firm 1. Therefore, we would expect it 
to be much cheaper for the economy as a whole to assign Firm 2 a greater reduction in 
emissions. This can be done by a tax set at p*. A tax would motivate Firm 2 to reduce 
its emissions much more than Firm 1, and thus pollution would be reduced at the 
lowest economic cost (see Baumol and Oates, 1988, 164). 
 
To society as a whole, the tax option is the cheapest option as illustrated by the 
following hypothetical comparison of the costs associated with the two types of policy 
instruments. Say, that q1 is 2 units, q* is 3 units and q2 is 4 units of reduction. Say, 
furthermore, that p1 is 3 ￿/unit, p* is 4 ￿/unit and p2 is 6 ￿/unit. Then we get the 
following results. If both firms face the same standard, q*, corresponding to 6 units of 
reduction in total, then reduction costs sum up to ￿13.5.
1  
 
On the other hand, if both firms face the optimal tax p*, total reduction costs are ￿12.
2 
This means that society saves ￿1.5 when using green taxation compared with a 
standard. In this way, a tax, p*, would motivate Firm 2 to reduce its emissions more 
than Firm 1, and thus pollution would be reduced at the lowest economic cost. Firm 1 
and Firm 2 will cut back emissions ‘until the marginal cost of further reductions in 
smoke output is equal to the tax’ (Baumol and Oates, 1971, 46). So, green taxation is 
economically more efficient than a standard from society’s point of view. 
 
However, this does not necessarily mean that taxation is better than a standard from 
polluters’ point of view. If tax revenues are not reimbursed, regulation by standards 
will be cheaper for industry than regulation by taxation (see Buchanan and Tullock, 
1975). Take a further look at Figure 1 and let us say that q3 corresponds to a 100 per 
cent reduction (no emission) equal to 6 units. A tax without refund means that on top 
of the reduction costs from reducing q1, Firm 1 must pay taxes for all units emitted, 
i.e. the rectangle (q3 – q1)p*. This extra tax payment of ￿16 together with the ￿4 in 
                                                        
1 Firm 1: ½ x 6 x 3 = 9; Firm 2: ½ x 3 x 3 = 4.5 
2 Firm 1: ½ x 4 x 2 = 4; Firm 2: ½ x 4 x 4 = 8 
  8 private reduction costs, means a total cost of ￿20 from green taxation without refund, 
compared with a total cost of ￿9 from a standard. Likewise, Firm 2 will face the extra 
tax payment costs of the rectangle (q3 – q2)p*. This extra cost of ￿8 added to the 
private reduction costs of ￿8 totals ￿16 which is significantly higher than the ￿4.5 
following standard regulation.  
 
Basing our proposition on this numerical example, we expect industry actively to 
pursue their interests in the political processes in which green tax schemes are 
designed. Moreover, given the distributional effects of environmental regulation, we 
also expect them to be fairly successful in influencing the policy design due to small-
group advantages. It is easier for industrial producers to lobby due to group size than 








We will now take a closer look at the empirical evidence to establish whether 
industrial groups more actively pursue their interest in the environmental policy 
process than do households and are more influential than them in affecting policy 
contents. We have chosen to focus on CO2 taxation in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. 
So far, only Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands have applied 
such taxes. There are three main reasons for focusing on Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden and omitting Finland and the Netherlands. First, these three Scandinavian 
countries have CO2 taxes which are levied through a separate self-contained tax 
scheme. In Finland and the Netherlands, the use of CO2  taxes takes place in 
connection with a more general energy tax where the CO2 component constitutes only 
a part of the tax base (Svendsen et al., 2001). Second, an extraordinary openness has 
made it possible to follow the development in decision-making in these three 
countries. Written documents cover the whole process. Third, the three Scandinavian 
countries represent a homogeneous group having fairly similar political and 
  9 administrative institutions. Most prominently, they are characterised by a high degree 
of corporatism: ‘The integration of organised interests into public and administrative 
policy making is a core political structure of the Scandinavian countries.’ 
(Christiansen, 1997, 3).  
 
Three appropriate cases for testing and comparing the effect of lobbyism are 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden because the CO2 emission in question, has global 
effect (ibid.). This means that no local or regional pollution effects can explain 
differences in the way CO2 is taxed. For each of the three cases, we have applied a 
two-phased approach. First, we reveal industrial interest groups’ presence in the 
policy making process, measured by their active opposition (i.e. activities in the 
media, contacts with government, published reports and statistical data, brochures, 
etc.). These activities are used as an indicator of their effort in the decision-making 
process. Second, we assess the effects of this effort. This is done by analysing the 
development of actual CO2 tax designs over time. In each of the three countries, we 
chose the same approach by focusing on two cases in each country, namely the 






Our data shows that in the three Scandinavian countries, the massive presence of 
industrial groups (measured by their active opposition, i.e. activities in the media, 
contacts with government, published reports and statistical data, brochures, etc.) was 
overwhelming compared to that of households. Thus, overall, the development of CO2 
taxation and later reforms supported the hypothesis that industry achieved their results 
by lobbyism. Industry, in contrast to households, was active when the instruments 
were designed to determine the outcome of the crucial issue of cost distribution of 
CO2 reduction costs. Let us briefly summarize the empirical findings in Daugbjerg 
and Svendsen (2001) concerning Denmark, Norway and Sweden. 
 
In  Denmark, a national CO2 target level was introduced in 1990. It stated that 
Denmark should reduce its CO2 emissions by 20 per cent from 1988 to year 2005 
  10 (Energiministeriet, 1990, 91). This target level was settled at a conference in 1989 
convened by the Danish Ministry of Energy (Folden et al., 1993, 53). In Denmark, 
industry reacted aggressively and they became the winners compared to the 
consumers who were by far the most heavily taxed group. The tax levels in the 
original Danish CO2 tax proposal were significantly lowered for industry during the 
political decision-making process and also the final bill referred to earlier included a 
system of generous voluntary agreements that industry asked for. This pattern was 
repeated, in the political decision-making process concerning the reform of CO2 tax 
(in 1995) being similar to that of the original CO2 tax (in 1991); here, 
environmentalists and consumer organisations had been represented in the initial 
phases but not in the final and decisive ones concerning instrument choice (Daugbjerg 
and Svendsen, 2001). 
 
The background for introducing CO2 taxation in Norway was the appointment of two 
commissions in 1989, namely the Climate Group and the MU Commission 
(‘Miljøafgiftsudvalget’). The recommendations of the two commissions formed the 
basis of the government proposal to let CO2 taxation to embrace industry and energy 
production (Tenfjord, 1995, 94–5). In Norway, industry dominated the political arena 
too and it was favoured by either no or lower CO2 taxes compared to households. 
Exemptions for industry were already a fact in Norway when designing the initial 
CO2 tax. Consumer interests were again, like in Denmark, almost absent after taking 
part in establishing an initial target level. Discussions on instruments and CO2 cost 
distribution in practice, among different sectors in society, left no room for consumer 
interests in the domestic decision-making process. Also, when a new Norwegian 
Green Tax Commission suggested that exempted industries should be taxed and 
government tried to enact it, the proposal was successfully blocked by industry 
(Daugbjerg and Svendsen, 2001). 
 
Sweden, like Denmark and Norway, established a national target level in the late 
1980s. In 1988, the government stated its ambition of stabilizing CO2 emissions at the 
1988 level (SOU 1989, 271). Beforehand, in 1987, the government had appointed a 
Green Tax Commission (Lundqvist, 1996, 314; Naturvårdsverket, 1997, 16). On the 
recommendation of the Green Tax Commission, a non-differentiated CO2 tax was 
imposed in January 1991 on industry  (Swedish Government, 1990, 147–64). This 
  11 initiated aggressive campaigning from Swedish industry resulting in a 1993 reform, 
where a new CO2 tax favoured manufacturing industry but punished the households. 
Thus, from early 1991, the trend corresponded exactly to the pattern observed in 
Denmark and Norway. In this way, lobbyism successfully turned unfavourable 
uniform taxation into politically acceptable differentiated CO2 taxation (Daugbjerg 
and Svendsen, 2001). 
 
This brief comparison of three Scandinavian cases of CO2 taxation confirms the 
hypothesis that industry has strong incentives to enter the policy process and have 
resources, and thus power, to influence policy contents to decrease costs. Clearly, the 
Scandinavian governments have been persuaded by industrial interest organisations to 
tax industry at a lower rate than households. When sectors that pollute the most are 
not taxed, pollution reduction does not take place in an optimal way. The original 
policy recommendation by Pigou (1920) is still valid in year 2000: an efficient 
environmental tax rate must be imposed directly on emissions and the tax rate must be 
uniform per emission unit.  
 
The existence of such a uniform environmental tax means that firms will reduce 
emissions up to the point where the marginal cost of reducing one extra pollution unit 
equals the tax rate. Therefore, it costs the same to reduce the last pollution unit in all 
firms. If the tax rate is not uniform, different polluters would face different tax levels. 
For example, producers facing low tax levels would stop reducing at the same low 
marginal cost level whereas consumers facing high tax levels would keep on reducing 
until their marginal reduction costs became high enough to match the tax rate level. In 
other words, because it is cheaper for producers than for consumers to reduce an extra 
pollution unit, society would be better off if producers reduced more and consumers 
less. This would lead to a lowering in the total reduction cost. As long as tax rates are 
not uniform, society can save costs by shifting pollution reductions from the high-
taxed to the low-taxed polluter. Only when all polluters face the same tax level, will 
the optimal situation be achieved, where all marginal reduction costs are identical for 
all polluters. It will no longer be possible to save costs by shifting pollution reduction 
between, for example, producers and consumers.  
 
  12 The overall finding is that political decision-makers must, with respect to industry, 
modify the current design of green taxation into a more politically feasible solution, 
for example by considering the use of tax reimbursement schemes as we do here or by 
considering other economic instruments such as tradable permit systems (concerning 
tradable permit systems, see e.g. Tietenberg, 1985; , Svendsen, 1998 and Daugbjerg 
and Svendsen, 2001, ch. 6); Boom and Svendsen, 2000 and Klaassen and Nentjes, 
1997). 
 
4: The problem of redistributive reimbursement 
 
Our numerical example in section 2 clearly demonstrated that reimbursement of green 
tax revenues is a crucial measure to make green taxation more acceptable to producer 
groups and thus decrease political opposition. Two basic requirements must be 
fulfilled to make green taxation acceptable to environmental interests and industry. 
First, to ensure that reimbursement does not neutralise the environmental incentives of 
the tax scheme, it must be independent of the level of pollution, otherwise the 
incentive to reduce pollution would be removed. For instance, it would not matter to 
the polluter how much s/he discharged or emitted if all of the money paid in taxes 
would be refunded. Second, reimbursement should not redistribute financial resources 
within the producer community subject to the tax. Redistribution within producer 
communities create winners and losers. This is likely to bring about mobilisation of 
opposition among losers, while potential winners have weaker incentives to mobilise 
for gains. However, redistributive green tax schemes are indeed applied. As long as 
the tax level is relatively low and the redistribution, caused by reimbursement, is 
limited, it may not bring about significant opposition. The problems of redistribution 
and opposition within producer groups increase with higher tax levels. Environmental 
policy makers may thus be caught in a unpleasant situation if they want to continue 
using green taxation as the major environmental regulatory instrument because to 
reach the stated reduction goals, higher tax levels are needed. 
 
Potential losers from green taxation are more likely to mobilise politically than 
potential winners. As Weaver (1986, 373) points out: ‘persons who have suffered 
losses are more likely to notice the loss, to feel aggrieved and to act on this grievance, 
  13 than gainers are to act on the basis on their improved state.’ In other words, people 
‘are more sensitive to what has … [been] done to them than what has been done for 
them’ (bid.). Experiments have shown that people feel more affected by losses than by 
gains (Thaler, 1980; Kahnemann and Tversky, 1979; Knetsch, 1990; Kahneman, 
Knetsch and Thaler, 1991). This means that losers have much better opportunities to 
mobilise than winners when redistributive policies are put onto the political agenda. 
Hence, it is crucial not to create losers when designing green taxes with 
reimbursement schemes. The trick is to develop refund schemes which do not 
redistribute. Some scholars are rather pessimistic about this. For instance, Leone 
(1986, 3) argues that ‘every act of government, no matter what its broader merits or 
demerits for society at large, creates winners and losers within the competitive sector 
of the economy. These gains and losses, which accrue to both individuals and 
corporations, become the object of intense political attention.’ Our analysis supports 
Leone’s argument to some extent, but we shall argue that in certain situations, 
reimbursement can take place without causing significant redistribution.  
 
It is important to distinguish between earmarked and non-earmarked reimbursement 
(Daugbjerg, 1998c). In the ear-marked approach, revenue is paid back as various 
types of environmental subsidies. To qualify for reimbursement, industrial producers 
are obliged to engage in environmentally friendly activities. Earmarked 
reimbursement may redistribute financial resources within producer communities, but 
the scheme is open to all producers. As a result, they have the opportunity to benefit 
from environmental subsidies, provided that they engage in certain environmentally 
friendly activities such as introducing cleaner production technologies or not farming 
in environmentally sensitive areas. In the non-earmarking approach, the revenue is 
refunded irrespective of whether industry engages in certain environmentally friendly 
activities or not. Proceeds are reimbursed automatically, e.g. through direct subsidies 
or through reductions of existing taxes. Members of the industry concerned are not 
obliged to do certain things to qualify for refunds. This means that industry tends to 
prefer non-earmarked reimbursement. However, these schemes are difficult to design 
because may easily redistribute economic resources within producer communities. 
This becomes a political problem since the individual producer cannot escape 
redistribution by engaging in certain environmentally friendly activities as s/he can in 
earmarked reimbursement. Thus, redistribution is not a choice, but a fact. To 
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which are frequently suggest in the literature on green taxation and, to a limited 
extent, has been applied in. These are reduced taxes linked to employment of labour 
and reduced corporate tax.  
 
 
4.1: Labour taxes 
 
Within the industrial sector, reimbursement through reduced income taxes (which is 
assumed to bring about lower wages) or reduced employer contributions to labour 
market services or social security, will inevitably bring about winners and losers 
among firms. An important source of redistribution is the extent to which enterprises 
employ labour and capital, for example, energy. Labour-intensive industries will 
benefit from reduction in labour costs, whereas energy-intensive industries are likely 
to lose. The Dutch tax on CO2 is an example of a green tax scheme causing 
redistribution through reimbursement by the reduction of tax contributions to labour 
market services. One of the winners is the financial sector and one of the losers is the 
food processing industry (VROM, 1998). The basic problem of reimbursement 
through reduced labour costs is that energy-intensive industries will oppose green 
taxation because each of them are likely to pay more in tax than they are likely to get 
back since the benefits are linked to the employment of labour. In other words, they 
are potential losers, and thus they have strong incentives to mobilise political 
opposition. Labour-intensive industries are potential winners, but may fail to lobby 
for a taxation and refund system because their incentives to mobilise politically are 
weaker. The Norwegian government’s failed attempt to broaden the CO2 tax is a 
powerful example supporting this theoretical argument. Revenues were to be refunded 
through reduced employer contributions to labour market services which meant that 
the energy-intensive industries in particular (mainly pulp and paper, chemical, 
metallurgical and oil industries) would lose out. Therefore, they had strong incentives 
to oppose the tax scheme, which they did successfully. The potential winners were the 
labour-intensive retail sector and service industries. In line with the theoretical 
argument, these two sectors, as potential winners, did little to support the government 
proposal, whereas the energy-intensive industries, as potential losers, put considerable 
effort into opposing the tax and eventually succeeded in having the proposal voted 
  15 down in parliament (Kasa, 1999; Svendsen et al., 2001). Given these incentive 
structures, it is difficult to impose a tax high enough to create noticeable incentive 
effects. Redistribution can only be avoided if there is a fairly equal relationship 





4.2: Corporate tax 
 
Corporate tax reductions also involve redistribution within producer communities. 
Firms which have high profits benefit more from lower company taxes than those 
which earn less money because there is no linear relationship between the level of 
earnings and the level of emissions. Thus, the side effect of corporate tax reductions is 
redistribution of financial resources from prosperous to less prosperous firms. 
Redistribution can only be avoided in industries with a fairly equal relationship between 
profits and emissions. These are hard to find in the real world. 
 
 
5: The future of green taxation and reimbursement in industrial 
sectors 
 
This paper has demonstrated that polluters prefer traditional command-and-control 
(i.e. standards) rather than green taxation without refund. In spite of the fact that green 
taxation is the cheapest solution for society as a whole, the polluter will still 
experience lower private costs when facing a standard without the added costs of tax 
payments. Therefore, proposals on green taxation are likely to meet strong opposition 
from industrial interest groups and they can easily mobilise resources to influence 
policy contents. Since similar incentives to enter the policy process cannot be found 
within consumer and environmental groups, industry is like to have considerable say 
on the design of green tax schemes. Empirical evidence from CO2 taxation in 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden support this theoretical expectation.  We have argued 
that there are ways to overcome the opposition to green taxation. The opportunities 
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revenues should be reimbursed. However, although policy makers follow these 
recommendations, there may still be major obstacles to the use of green taxation in 
economic sectors because reimbursement schemes may redistribute within producer 
communities, thus creating winners and losers. 
 
Our analysis of two reimbursement models demonstrates clearly that they cause 
redistribution and, therefore, are not attractive to industrial interest groups. Since 
people are more sensitive to losses than gains, losers are more likely to mobilise 
politically than winners. In other words, both reimbursement models are likely to cause 
asymmetry in interest mobilisation in favour of those opposing green taxation. The 
analysis also shows that in heterogeneous sectors, it is difficult to develop green tax 
schemes which reimburse revenues without bringing about winners and losers within 
producer communities and, at the same time, avoid neutralising the incentives to 
reduce emissions.  
 
The models discussed are fairly simple and do not require availability of considerable 
administrative resources to be implemented. Of course, more sophisticated 
reimbursement models may redistribute to a lesser degree than the simple models 
discussed. However, in practice, such schemes may be troublesome to design and 
administer. First, it might be difficult to ensure that reimbursement schemes do not 
neutralise the incentive effects. Second, to avoid redistribution, they may have to be 
very complex, which in turn means that they may be difficult to administer for bodies 
responsible for implementation of the schemes. Further, these administrative 
difficulties may increase the risk of mismanagement and perhaps fraud. Third, 
complex reimbursement models have a high risk of causing unintended consequences. 
For example, the Danish CO2 tax scheme has a complicated refund system which 
turned out to produce perverse incentives. It motivated the Confederation of Danish 
Industries to encourage its members to increase their CO2 emissions to receive higher 
refunds and thereby save money (CDI, 1992; Daugbjerg and Svendsen, 2001). 
Finally, unintended redistributive effects may arise because large firms that can afford 
to employ staff to get as much revenue back as possible may benefit more from 
reimbursement than those firms which do not have the resources to hire extra 
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redistribute from small to large companies, and then we are back to where we started. 
 
To prevent reimbursement schemes resulting in a redistribution within the sectors 
taxed, we must identify some homogeneous traits within the sector concerned. It is 
essential that there is an equal relationship between the tax object and the object 
determining the level of reimbursement throughout the sector. Thus, the more 
homogeneous the sector, the more opportunities there are to develop reimbursement 
schemes which do not redistribute within producer communities.  
 
The Danish case of pesticide taxation is an illustrative example of successful 
reimbursement within an economic sector which is no longer as homogeneous as 
earlier. Farmers have specialised in the production of one product. Homogeneous 
traits could be identified and used as the foundation of reimbursement. This meant 
that the reimbursement schemes caused only minor redistribution within the farming 
community.  
 
In 1995, the Danish government introduced a pesticide tax which, compared with 
those of the other Scandinavian countries, was set at a high level. The tax on 
insecticides was equal to 37 percent of the retail price and on fungicides, herbicides 
and crop growth-regulating chemicals, it was equal to 15 percent (Daugbjerg and 
Svendsen, 2001). The introduction of such a tax demonstrates that when 
reimbursement schemes are carefully designed in order to limit redistribution, green 
taxes can be set at a high level even in sectors in which producers are powerful. The 
tax revenue is reimbursed by the suspension of the state land tax. In this way, 
reimbursement is independent of the amount of pesticides used. As pointed out above 
this is an important prerequisite ensuring that the incentive to reduce pesticide use is 
not neutralised by reimbursement.  
 
As argued above, minimisation of redistribution within producer communities 
resulting from reimbursement is crucial obtaining acceptance of green taxation. The 
Danish pesticide tax scheme minimises redistribution because a positive correlation 
between land values and pesticide use exists. The reason that this relationship existed 
was that the most pesticide demanding crops were grown at the good and expensive 
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taxes. Since farmers in these areas paid a larger amount in land taxes due to high land 
values, they would get a larger amount reimbursed by the suspension of the state land 
tax than those farming the land of lower soil quality and therefore lower land value. 
However, minor redistrubution could not be avoided. While the overall redistribution 
between dairy, pig and arable farmers was minimal, regional differences occurred. 
The great losers, farmers in the county of Bornholm, would lose 38 Danish kroner per 
hectare because of low land values. The winners would be farmers in the rural areas 
close to Copenhagen. They would win 52 kroner per hectare. Furthermore, small 
farms would gain 14 kroner per hectare, while the largest ones would only lose 7. 
(Skatteministeren 1995).
3 During the preparation of the proposal, substantial work 
was done to develop the reimbursement scheme and estimating its effects on the 
distribution of income. Both the Farmers Union and the Ministry of Agriculture was 
engaged in this work (interview, Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries, 2000). 
 
The fact that the reimbursement scheme involved only minor redistribution within the 
farming community is an important reason why the Danish government succeeded in 
introducing a relatively high pesticide tax in 1995. This type of reimbursement did not 
generate winners and losers among farmers, and therefore the farmers’ unions 
accepted the pesticide tax (Daugbjerg, 2001). In 1998, the government doubled the 
pesticide tax and adopted a reimbursement scheme which redistributed from 
conventional farms to organic farms. This was opposed by the losers within the 
farmers’ union, and within half a year they succeeded in persuading politicians to 
reduce local land taxes to diminish redistribution (Daugbjerg and Svendsen, 2001). 
 
Within the industrial sector, the idea of reimbursement is much more problematic 
because the sector, as a whole, is considerably more heterogeneous than the 
agricultural sector. This means that it may be difficult to identify some common traits 
across the sector which can become the foundations of reimbursements. Industry-wide 
reimbursement will inevitably bring about winners and losers and, as a result, 
considerable opposition to green taxation.  
 
                                                        
3 However, horticulture would lose income and, therefore, special measures were put into operation to 
ensure that it was not undercompensated (Skatteministeren 1995). 
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homogeneous branches. Then, opportunities for operating relatively simple 
reimbursement schemes for each branch which do not redistribute within the 
industrial branch concerned may arise.  This approach has not yet been applied in 
green taxation; however, there is no reason why it could not be done. In the 
Netherlands, a voluntary agreement for each industrial branch is a major policy 
instrument in environmental regulation. By year 2000, 29 agreements had been made 
(Enevoldsen, 2000, 73). If a branch approach can be operated in relation to voluntary 
agreements, why shouldn’t it be manageable in relation to green taxes with 
reimbursement schemes? Such specific reimbursement models have not yet been 
developed. The two general models (reduced taxes linked to employment of labour 
and reduced corporate taxes) discussed above are not applicable as reimbursement 
models in industrial branches because they will also redistribute at this level. New 
models must be developed. This is the future challenge to the advocates of green 
taxation if this approach in environmental regulation is to bring about the 
environmental reduction targets set out. As shown in the introduction to this article, so 
far the tax approach has failed to reduce CO2 emissions to the level desired. Higher 
taxes are required to bring about reductions; however, unless non-redistributive 
reimbursement schemes can be developed, it may be difficult to increase the tax level.  
 
It is far beyond the scope of this article to develop new green tax models. We limit 
ourselves to suggest that future environmental policy research on green taxation pays 
more attention to the necessity of reimbursement, and in particular the necessity of 
reimbursement schemes which do not redistribute within producer communities. 
Clearly, there is a great need of research on this issue. For advocates of green 
taxation, the future force of the approach does not lie in further technical refinement 
of the tax model itself, but in the ability to develop reimbursement schemes which do 
not redistribute within producer communities and thus decrease industrial opposition. 
It may well turn out that in some branches, green taxation with reimbursement cannot 
be implemented without causing redistribution within them. In such case other 
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